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I. Introduction 
 
Cases concerning freedom of business are difficult to deal with from a judicial 
point of view, as they are often outside the framework of the judiciary.  At least, that 
has been the view of the Japanese Supreme Court. 
 
The Japanese Supreme Court, in its constitutional review based on Article 81 
of the Constitution1, has held to a “self-restrained position” in dealing with such cases, 
and has respected the policies of the National Diet and the Cabinet. It has often 
deemed constitutional the measures taken by the legislators and the administration 
that restricted this freedom. 
 
Chapter 3 of the Constitution, entitled “Rights and Duties of the People”, in 
Article 22, Clause 1, affirms the freedom to choose one’s occupation.  This is 
interpreted as also protecting the freedom of business.  According to the text, 
                                                 
 
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Seigakuin University 
1 The Japanese Constitution enacted in 1946 laid down for the first time in Japan the Democracy, the 
Sovereignty and the Fundamental Rights of the People.  The Constitution has literally remained 
unchanged since then, a fact that makes revision of the Constitution a politically sensitive matter.  
The Japanese system of constitutional review is considered to be the same as that in the United 
States.  However, the Japanese system is based on an article within the Constitution, whereas the 
United States system was created by a famous Federal Supreme Court case: Marbury v. Madison (5 
U. S.〔1 Cranch〕137, 2 L. Ed. 60〔1803〕).  A doctrine stressing this difference maintains that 
adoption of another system is possible in Japan, without necessarily changing the Constitution. That 
system would be the creation of a special Court for constitutional review such as the one in 
Germany.  In fact, a case that the Japanese Supreme Court rendered on October 8th 1952 (Civil 
Case Book, No. 6-9, p. 782), can be read as opening this possibility.  Article 81 of the Japanese 
Constitution states as follows: The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to 
determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act. 
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however, this freedom is assured only “to the extent that it does not interfere with the 
public welfare”, and the notion of “public welfare” hereby permits certain regulations. 
 
II. Social Policy Regulation (Positive Regulation) and Police Safety 
Regulation (Negative Regulation) 
 
In the early days following enactment of the Constitution in 1946, the notion 
of “public welfare” was interpreted by the Japanese Supreme Court as a notion 
admitting broad and inclusive regulation of the freedom of business2.  For example, 
in a judgment rendered on June 21, 1950, the public employment law was considered 
constitutional.  This prohibited private employment agencies, on the grounds that 
such an enterprise was against the “public welfare”3.  The notion of “public welfare” 
was frequently employed even to justify legislative or administrative restrictions on 
the freedom of expression, yet the Court had never defined the term.  The use of this 
notion, in fact, helped the “self-restrained position” of the Supreme Court in judging 
as constitutional the measures taken by legislators and the administration4. 
 
It was on April 30, 1975 that the Supreme Court ruled for the first time that a 
pharmaceutical law regulating the freedom of business was against the Constitution.  
According to the law, establishing a pharmacy was subject to a restriction requiring it 
                                                 
2 The term “public welfare” appears in four articles of the Constitution: Articles 12 and 13, Paragraph 
1 of Article 22 and Paragraph 2 of Article 29.  The last two are the only articles concerning 
economic freedom. 
Article 12: The freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be 
maintained by the constant endeavor of rights and shall always refrain from any abuse of these 
freedoms and rights and shall always be responsible for utilizing them for the public welfare. 
Article 13: All of the people shall be respected as individuals.  Their right to life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be 
the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs. 
Article 22: Every person shall have freedom to choose and change his residence and to choose 
his occupation to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare. 
2) Freedom of all persons to move to a foreign country and to divest themselves of their nationality 
shall be inviolate. 
Article 29: The right to own or to hold property is inviolable. 
2) Property rights shall be defined by law, in conformity with the public welfare. 
3) Private property may be taken for public use upon just compensation therefor.  
 
In fact, the term had been abused by the government and even by the legislators, before and during 
the war, under the precedent Constitution enacted in 1889, to justify broad and inclusive 
regulations of rights. 
3 Criminal Case Book, No. 4-6, p. 1049. 
4 The Japanese Supreme Court is often evaluated as taking a “self-restrained position” in its 
judgments, leaving a rather broad range of discretion to the legislators and to the administration. 
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to be located a certain minimum distance from other existing pharmacies5.  This 
judgment is one of the five rare cases in which the Supreme Court judged certain 
provisions of laws to be unconstitutional in themselves6. 
 
1. Criteria based on objectives of the regulations --- Positive and negative 
regulations --- 
In the above judgment, the Supreme Court adopted two standards for judging 
the constitutionality of the pharmaceutical law.  The first is the “double standard”, 
which originated in the United States Supreme Court7, which distinguishes mental 
freedom from economic freedom, according predominance to the former, and 
therefore applying relatively narrow criteria in judging the constitutionality and the 
rationality of its restriction, while the constitutionality and rationality of the restriction 
on economic freedom is judged under less restrictive criteria. 
 
The second standard adopted by the judgment classifies restrictions on 
economic freedom according to their objectives.  A restriction imposed to achieve a 
certain social policy is called a “positive regulation” whereas a restriction imposed on 
economic freedom for the purpose of safeguarding the public safety and health is 
called a “negative regulation”.  To judge the constitutionality of a positive regulation, 
the Court applies the “standard of rationality”, known as a relatively lenient principle, 
where the Court judges that the law violates the Constitution only when the 
unlawfulness is clear. In contrast, a negative regulation requires a relatively narrow 
standard, and the Court utilizes the “standard of restrictive rationality”. 
 
                                                 
5 Civil Case Book, No. 29-4, p. 572. 
6 The following are the four other cases. 
 
1) The case rendered on April 4th 1973 (Criminal Case Book, No. 27-3, p. 265.), concerning the ex 
Article 200 of the criminal code stipulating the most serious crime for a homicide of ascendants.  
It was considered to violate the principle of equality under the law (Article 14 of the 
Constitution), in that it discriminated from the crime of ordinary homicide; 
2) Two cases rendered on April 22nd 1976 (Civil Case Book, No. 30-3, p. 223.) and July 17th 1985 
(Civil Case Book, No. 39-5, p. 1100.) concerning the inequality of distribution of seats in the 
House of Representatives; 
3) The case rendered on April 22nd 1987 (Civil Case Book, No. 41-3, p. 408.) concerning the forest 
law which restricted the property rights of the co-owners. 
 
7 The Japanese courts have taken various criteria and standards from the judgments of the United 
States Supreme Court.  The “double standard” is an example. 
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The restriction imposed by the pharmaceutical law has been classified as a 
negative regulation, because the purpose of the legislation is to prevent danger to 
public life and health.  The Law was enacted to prevent over-establishment and 
over-competition among pharmacies because it might lead to degradation of the 
quality of medicine, and the Court held that the objective of the Law can well be 
realized by a less restrictive measure and that it therefore restricts the Constitution8. 
 
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court rendered a judgment on November 22, 1972, 
in a case regarding the retail market.  The Supreme Court held that the license 
system for establishing a retail market is not unconstitutional because it is based on 
the objective of protecting small and medium sized enterprises and therefore can be 
classified as a positive restriction9. 
 
2. Ambiguity of the criteria 
One of the biggest problems in classifying restrictions on economic freedom 
according to their objectives is that, as the government’s policy became more complex, 
it has grown increasingly difficult to distinguish whether a certain regulation should 
be classified as a positive regulation or a negative one.  As the Supreme Court itself 
points out, the objectives of a certain regulation are “various” and “of many kinds”, so 
it is hard to discriminate one from another.  For example, among cases regarding the 
regulation of locations where public baths may be established, the judgment rendered 
on January 26, 1955, emphasizing its objective for the public health, held that 
over-competition can be injurious in terms of sanitation10.  Unlike the situation in 
1955, the majority of Japanese people had their own baths at home in 1989, so they no 
longer needed to go to a public bath.  In 1989, the Supreme Court emphasized the 
positive aspect of public baths, and deemed it more important to stabilize the 
management of existing public baths, in order to provide them to the minority of 
                                                 
8 The purpose of the regulation, which is the prevention of degradation of the quality of medicine, is 
considered as negative.  The court therefore rules here on the basis of the “standard of restrictive 
rationality”. 
9 Criminal Case Book, No. 26-9, p. 586. 
10 Criminal Case Book, No. 9-1, p. 89. 
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people that cannot afford a bath at home (judgment on January 20, 198911, and on 
March 7, 198912). 
 
In the case of public baths, the emphasis of the objective has shifted from the 
negative to the positive, but, in fact, most of the policies have both aspects 
simultaneously.  Even in the 1975 pharmaceutical law judgment mentioned above, 
the Supreme Court pointed out that the regulation on location can indirectly promote 
the establishment of pharmacies in areas where there are few or no pharmacies. 
 
By using a lenient standard in examining the constitutionality of the positive 
regulations, the Supreme Court leaves the decision to the discretion of the legislative 
and administrative organs.  The Supreme Court asserts that situations requiring 
positive regulations are too complex and that they are a highly specialized matter, so it 
is difficult for the Court to demonstrate that it is not needed.  Therefore, the Court 
can judge that the law is unconstitutional only when the unlawfulness and the 
deviation of discretion by the legislature are clear.  That, in fact, rarely occurs, and in 
most cases the discretion of the legislators is respected. 
 
On the other hand, in cases involving negative regulations, the Supreme Court 
affirms that the necessity of the regulation and its rationality can be judged by “sound 
common sense”.  Here, the regulation can be considered constitutional only when the 
legislature can demonstrate its necessity and its rationality. 
 
III. The Effect of Globalization on the Protection and Regulation of 
Business Freedom  
 
1. The decision of the Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of 
Germany concerning pharmaceutical law 
 
A decision in Germany rendered on July 11, 195813 is a good example for 
comparison.  In this case, the Federal Constitutional Court held that the 
pharmaceutical law of the state of Bayern was unconstitutional.  The law restricted 
                                                 
11 Criminal Case Book, No. 43-1, p. 1. 
12 Hanrei-Jiho (Jurisprudence Review), No. 1308, p. 111. 
13 BverfGE 7, 377, Urteil v. 11.7.1958. 
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the locations where pharmacies could be established.  The Court did not characterize 
the regulations as positive or negative, but it held that “subjective conditions” and 
“objective conditions” should be met in judging the constitutionality of a license 
system that restricts the freedom to choose one’s occupation (including the freedom of 
business).  A subjective condition calls upon the people wishing to assume a certain 
office or to conduct a certain business to judge for themselves whether or not they 
fulfill the conditions required.  The fulfillment of these subjective conditions is 
examined in the principle of proportionality. 
 
Objective conditions meanwhile must be fulfilled when restrictions are based 
on “objective necessity”.  The confirmation of this necessity is examined with 
narrow criteria, and the Court holds it to be constitutional only when the regulation is 
necessary to prevent imminent danger to especially important interests of the 
community. 
 
In this case, the Court has fully verified the necessity of the regulation, and 
held that there is no danger to the health of the residents if the number of pharmacies 
increases, and therefore the regulation is unconstitutional. 
 
2. The judgment of the European Court of Justice and discretionary power 
of the European Commission ---- Case C-180/96 concerning the validity of 
the emergency regulatory measures against BSE ---- 
 
In 1996, the European Court rendered a judgment concerning bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), or ‘mad cow disease’14.  It declared that the 
emergency measures taken by the European Commission15 banning exports from the 
United Kingdom to other Member States and to third countries of bovine animals and 
bovine meat or products obtained from it, was not a misuse of its powers.  The Court 
observed that the purpose of the directives16 from which those powers are derived is 
to enable the Commission to intervene rapidly in order to prevent the spread of a 
disease affecting animals or a threat to human health. 
                                                 
14 Case C-180/96 UK v. Commission [1998] ECR I-2265; Case C-157/96 R v. MAFF, ex p. National 
Farmer’s Union [1998] ECR I-2211. 
15 Decision 96/239. 
16 Council Directives 89/662 & 90/425. 
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As regards a possible breach of the principle of proportionality, the Court 
noted that when the contested decision was adopted there was great uncertainty 
regarding the risks posed by live animals, bovine meat and derived products. Where 
there is uncertainty regarding the existence or extent of risks to human health, the 
institutions may take protective measures without having to wait until the reality and 
seriousness of those risks become fully apparent.  Consequently, in view of the 
seriousness of the risk and the urgency of the situation, a temporary export ban cannot 
be regarded as a manifestly inappropriate measure, and the Commission displayed due 
caution by imposing a general ban on exports of bovine animals, bovine meat and 
derived products pending more detailed scientific information. 
 
3. Necessity of applying international norms assuring business freedom  
On February 6, 1990, the Japanese Supreme Court held as constitutional 
modification of the Law Concerning the Market Price Stabilization of Raw Silk, and it 
imposed regulations on the import of raw silk17.  The applicants in this case were the 
manufacturers of neckties made of Nishijin textiles, and they asked for compensation 
from the State, saying that the protective measures obliged them to buy domestic raw 
silk, which was twice the price of foreign products, and that the measures were 
counter to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as well as against 
Article 22 of the Constitution assuring the freedom of business.  The Kyoto district 
court in this case, denied the self-executing character of the Agreement, saying that 
infringement on the Agreement may bring certain disadvantages based on the 
Agreement itself, but that it has no other legal force18.  The Supreme Court held that 
the regulation is “positive” and that its purpose is to “protect the silkworm raising 
industry”.  Adopting the “standard of rationality”, it concluded that the unlawfulness 
of the measure concerned is unclear in this case.  The Supreme Court did not decide 
whether the measure was against the Agreement. 
 
The Uruguay Round held under the GATT led to the creation of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994.  After this change, application of the 
International Agreement gained even greater importance, as it is no longer based on a 
                                                 
17 Shomu-Geppo (Justice Monthly Review), No. 36-12, p. 2242. 
18 The judgment on June 29th 1984, Shomu-Geppo, No. 31-2, p. 207. 
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“provisionary” protocol, but on the agreement itself, and it could deprive the 
legislative or executive organs of the contracting parties from entering into negotiated 
arrangements, even on a temporary basis. 
 
About this same time, in 1994, the United States enacted the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act providing that U. S. federal law prevails over the Uruguay Round 
Agreement in the event of a conflict (Section 102 (a)), and that the Uruguay Round 
Agreements prevail over state law, but only in actions brought by the U. S. 
government (Section 102 (b) (2)).  In addition, under the Act, no person (except the 
United States) has a cause of action or defense under any Uruguay Round Agreement 
by virtue of congressional approval thereof, nor may any person challenge a federal, 
state or local law or action or inaction on the grounds that it is inconsistent with the 
Uruguay Round Agreement, nor may a private party rely on the results of an action 
brought by the federal government (Section 102 (c))19. 
 
Also in Europe, Decision 94/800 declares that “by its nature, the Agreement 
establishing the World Trade Organisation, including the Annexes thereto, is not 
susceptible to being directly invoked in Community or Member State courts”20.  This 
position was confirmed by the recent Case C-149/96 in the European Court21 , in 
which it was held that “having regard to their nature and structure, the WTO 
agreements are not in principle among the rules, in the light of which the Court is to 
review the legality of measures adopted by Community institutions”. 
In Japan, the National Diet made no such statement of reservation at the 
moment of ratification.  Therefore, the role of the Supreme Court has become even 
more important in judging the cases individually in order to safeguard social values 
based on the Constitution. 
 
 
                                                 
19 See Jackson, J. J., “Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis”, 86 AJIL 310, 
1992; Hill, M., “The Role of National Courts in International Trade Relations”, 18 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 321, 1997. 
20 Council Decision 94/800/EC of 22 December 1994 concerning the conclusion on behalf of the 
European Community, as regards matters within its competence, of the agreements reached in the 
Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations (1986-1994) (OJ 1994 L 336, p. 1). 
21 Case C-149/96, Portuguese Republic v. Council of the European Union. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
As the economic system becomes increasingly complex, the demand for a 
liberal economy and free trade on one side and the demand for a more substantial 
policy for social welfare on the other grow more intertwined. 
 
The Japanese Supreme Court, in exercising its role of constitutional review, 
has so far given a broad range of discretion to other organs, under the pretext that the 
Court lacks the ability to rule on highly technical and specialized economic matters. 
 
Yet, as the economic system becomes more complex, and as international 
norms directly affect national law, values written in the Constitution, such as that of 
social welfare, can only be safeguarded by constitutional review.  It is high time, 
therefore, that the Supreme Court abandon its criteria of positive and negative 
distinctions in regulations, engage the world of economic norms and fulfill its role as 
guardian of the rule of law. 
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